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Commentary on the Proposed Liberia Economic Governance Action Plan (LEGAP)
Aug 4, 2005
Author: W. Nim’ne Elliott Mombo, Sr.)
Liberians are hotly debating the proposed Liberia Economic Governance Action Plan (LEGAP) that has been put forward by what the Plan refers to as the “US-EU-ECOWAS Troïka.” The vexing aspect of the proposal has to do with its provisions for placing non nationals with “executive authority” or otherwise with “signature authority” in key positions within the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Central Bank of Liberia (CBL), the Bureau of Customs and Excise (BCE), the Bureau of the Budget (BoB) and also in a number of key State Owned Enterprises (SoEs), principal among these being the National Port Authority (NPA), the Liberia Petroleum Refining Company (LPRC) and Roberts International Airport (RIA).
Opponents of the plan see this as an unwarranted and unacceptable intrusion that would effectively put Liberia into trusteeship or receivership and thereby undermine our national sovereignty. Many supporters insist that not only is such receivership necessary for Liberia at this time it is, they believe, indeed the only way to put the Country on a good footing and get us out of the mess we are in. They therefore see effective receivership as a bitter pill that we must swallow, along with our national pride, in order to save us from ourselves and to keep Liberia from becoming another Somalia, a permanently failed state that the rest of the world has forgotten. Those who espouse this view basically see LEGAP as a panacea, a miracle cure of sorts, for all of Liberia’s myriad problems.
There are, in my view, valid concerns and arguments on both sides. Thankfully there are also some Liberians who, while in sympathy with the central thrust of the LEGAP proposal, want to see it modified in ways that, if properly implemented, will enable the country and its international partners (EU, US, ECOWAS) to achieve the principal goals of the plan but without the distasteful implications of trusteeship or receivership. This piece is intended to add my voice to those of the moderates.
Areas of General Agreement
I am persuaded that all fair minded and well meaning Liberians, whatever their persuasions on the LEGAP issue, do readily agree that our Country is indeed in deep trouble and in a very bad state of decay in all important respects: governance, the infra structure, the national economy, health, education and everything that these deficiencies imply. By and large, we are all agreed that the problems identified in the LEGAP document are real and endemic in Liberia; that these problems need to be urgently and realistically addressed; and that without question, Liberia does need external help to get a handle on them.
Finally, it seems fair to say that, the vexing question of foreign experts aside, many well meaning Liberians will probably agree that the remaining core components of the LEGAP proposal, if suitably and realistically Liberianized and vigorously pursued, can yet save Liberia and give its people new realistic hope. The question then is how can the original LEGAP proposal be realistically modified and yet remain acceptable to all stakeholders?
On the Central Bank of Liberia
A convenient place to start for this purpose is with the LEGAP provision for reforming the Central Bank of Liberia (CBL). Below is the relevant text:
“There is need to remove constraints affecting the effective operations of … key institutions involved in economic governance. In particular: (i) The independence of the Central Bank of Liberia needs to be upheld, and any acquiescence, on the part of Central Bank, to effect payments which have not been approved by the CMCo should be discontinued…”
“In order to resolve these issues:
The Central Bank of Liberia will have i) complete independence to operate in accordance with the provisions of the 1999 Financial Institutions Act as well as the Central Bank of Liberia Act, ii) a new position of Chief Administrator with executive authority will be created and the IMF will be requested to identify a suitable person for this position…”
Observe that, per the LEGAP proposal, the principal problem with the Central Bank has to do with its de facto independence from the Executive Mansion, not so much its general management, technical or otherwise. It is also noteworthy that, perhaps for good reason, the LEGAP document makes no reference whatever to issues of compensation at CBL that have been widely circulated in recent times. In any case, the document quickly acknowledges that there are laws on the books that do provide for the independence of the Central Bank. Therefore, what the LEGAP proposal seeks is clearly not simply the theoretical de jure independence of the Bank. Instead its creators apparently want to create an environment in which “the Central Bank of Liberia will [truly] have complete independence to operate in accordance with the provisions of the 1999 Financial Institutions Act as well as the Central Bank of Liberia Act.”
Does CBL Need A Chief Administrator?
This is all very well and good and even laudable – except for the fact that without indicating any basis or justification for so doing, the LEGAP proposal then appears to jump to the conclusion that the only way to ensure such “complete independence” of the Bank is to create “a new position of Chief Administrator with executive authority,” a position for which “the IMF will be requested to identify a suitable person.” Nothing at all is said or even suggested about finding a qualified Liberian for this post, or for that matter, why such a post is even considered necessary in the first place.
The implied suggestion here is that to ensure its “complete independence” the Bank must always have a “Chief Administrator with executive authority” who must not be a Liberian. Instead, s/he must be a foreigner. The inescapable inference here is that no Liberian should or can be trusted with so critical a position either because (a) there are none technically competent to perform the duties envisioned for that post and/or (b) no Liberian can be expected to have sufficient personal integrity or independence of mind to meet the requirements of this all important post. The fallacy of such an inference is that, by implication, CBL’s “complete independence” will be viable only for the duration of the LEGAP arrangement, since in order to maintain such “complete independence” beyond that period, the Central Bank of Liberia must always or indefinitely hire a foreigner as its “Chief Administrator with executive authority.”
The document is silent as to the intent and the extent of the “executive authority” of the Chief Administrator vis a vis the executive authority of the Governor as CEO of the Central Bank; or for that matter, possibly the policy setting authority of the Board of Governors, who presumably will be Liberians. This lack of clarity for a post that LEGAP clearly considers so critically important is troubling because it raises valid concerns as to the practical implications of the kind of “executive authority” to be vested in the Chief Administrator.
Why Not A General Manager Or A Financial Controller?
In particular, there seems to be a suggestion (though the document has skilfully avoided spelling this out) that, in practice, the Chief Administrator’s “executive authority” is expected to be such that, for all practical intents and purposes, s/he will be in position to effectively (but not formally) veto the administrative decisions of the Governor, who is the Chief Executive Officer of the Bank and possibly even the policy decisions of CBL’s Board of Governors. Otherwise, why a Chief Administrator with executive authority instead of a General Manager or a Controller? Either officer would, by virtue of the post occupied, have significant signature authority. So why wouldn’t either of these positions do for the purpose?
Apparently because the signature authority of a general manager or a financial controller would still be subordinate in certain important respects to the executive authority of the Governor. One gets the impression that the framers of LEGAP consider this inadequate for their purpose. Hence their insistence that “a new position of Chief Administrator with executive authority will [have to] be created.” The practical effect of this arrangement will then be that for the duration of the LEGAP regime, the real “executive authority” of the Bank will be vested, de facto, in its Chief Administrator, who must be a foreigner, with a Liberian Executive Governor and a Liberian Board of Governors, as mere figureheads.
On reflection, it is easy to see why this aspect of the LEGAP proposal so strongly angers some Liberians, including those who readily admit to the cancer of decadence and rampant corruption that is fast destroying the very foundations of our national institutions. To make matters worse, the document does not provide a definite timeframe for this arrangement. Different timelines, some as little as five years or so; others as long as 20 to 25 years, have been suggested in the news media.
Given the cost implications of the proposal, it is unlikely that the Security Council (whose approval of the plan is required) will opt for a long term duration of 20 to 25 years. Based on precedent, a five-year option seems more likely to win the required approval, in the immediate term, probably with prospects for subsequent extensions of one or two years each at a later date. On that basis, it is difficult to see how the change proposed in the LEGAP document (i.e., temporarily shifting the effective “executive authority” of the Bank from the Governor, a national, to an externally imposed all powerful “Chief Administrator” for a period of five years or so can realistically be expected to be in the long term interest of Liberia and its people.
The LBDI Model
So what would be a viable alternative to the LEGAP proposal? How can the CBL be positioned to become truly independent of the Executive Mansion outside of the framework of the LEGAP proposal? To answer this question it is useful contrast the arrangement per the LEGAP proposal for CBL with what has actually obtained at the Liberian Bank for Development and Investment (LBDI) for more than forty years, from the days of William V.S. Tubman right through the years of Mr. Charles Taylor as well as the intervening interim governments between Doe and Taylor.
In this regard some readers will no doubt recall that in the mid 1980’s, when Mr. Samuel Doe was at the height of his dictatorial powers, he did attempt to replace Mr. David Vinton, the then President of LBDI with an appointee of his choosing. Mr. Vinton refused to step down, insisting that with all due respect to the President of the Republic, it was neither within the latter’s authority to remove a duly elected President of the Bank nor to appoint a successor president for LBDI. Vinton maintained that the power to appoint or remove the Chief Executive Officer of LBDI is vested in the Bank’s Board of Directors, not in the President of Liberia.
The Bank’s Board of Directors promptly met to discuss the matter. As a face-saver for Mr. Doe and clearly as a practical compromise, they decided to let stand Vinton’s removal from the post, clearly illegal though it was. But very importantly, they also refused to accept Mr. Doe’s appointee. Instead, Vinton stayed on for a time while the Board searched for his replacement. Eventually, the Board appointed Mr. Phillip Bowen (peace to his remains), who was at the time a Deputy Minister at the Ministry of Finance, to succeed Vinton, who was then duly compensated for the illegal sacking. Vinton then established a business that he still runs to this day.
The point to note here is that in the case of LBDI, in sharp contrast to the situations at the National Bank of Liberia (NBL), which later became the Central Bank of Liberia (CBL) and just about everywhere else in Liberia, the Executive Mansion, in spite of its own best efforts to do so, clearly failed in its attempt to intrude into the day to day running of LBDI. Subsequent attempts by Doe and his successors to raid the bank under the guise of “government borrowing” have, in similar fashion, also been effectively contained over the years, albeit at times with considerable difficulty.
It is also noteworthy that LBDI is being run one hundred percent by Liberian professionals. It has been that way for over forty years, from the 1960’s when it was founded, in the days of William V.S. Tubman, to the present. I am in position to confirm that from where I sit, LBDI is and has been, in my opinion, one of the best-run financial institutions in the Country. This is not to say that the Bank is perfect and without any fault, since no human institution is; not even the UN, the World Bank or the IMF. Rather, it is to contrast its relative success in a number of critically important respects during periods of unprecedented upheavals, with the decay and dismal failures that has prevailed everywhere else in the cases of state owned enterprises (SoEs) that have been similarly resourced as LBDI or even those that were better resourced (e.g., NPA, LPRC and LPMC) than was the Bank.
For example, in contrast to the politically enforced turnover of key staff that is so commonplace in all other state owned institutions in Liberia, LBDI boasts a relatively low turnover among its key staff. Members of its current leadership have grown up through the ranks at the Bank. They average upwards of twenty to twenty five years of tenure each. That is both remarkable and commendable in Liberia, especially during the turbulent twenty five year period that commenced with Liberia’s bloody Coup d’état of 1980. In the process they have acquired very valuable skills and knowledge that they use for the benefit of the Bank. This is how successful enterprises are run everywhere.
A Difference That Matters
So what exactly is different about LBDI that has enabled it to withstand the vicissitudes of Liberia’s recent past? Why was its Board of Directors able to successfully say to no a dictator like Samuel Doe (something that was unthinkable in any other SoE) and thereby maintain the institutional independence of that Bank in contrast to what has obtained during that same period at NBL/CBL and various other State owned institutions? How come that with but two notable exceptions, succession to the top positions at this Bank has, for more than forty years, consistently been from within and by authority of its Board of Directors rather than externally imposed (based solely on political considerations), as routinely happens in the case of other state-owned institutions in Liberia? To what does LBDI owe the relative stability of its professional staff in an environment so widely characterized by cronyism, nepotism and whimsical decision making from the Executive Mansion?
The answer derives primarily from the composition and authority of LBDI’s Board of Directors. The principal distinguishing feature of this body is that, as enshrined in its Articles of Incorporation and its By Laws, LBDI’s board of directors is required to comprise a healthy balance of government in partnership with private enterprise. Though the Minister of Finance is, ex official, the Chairman of its Board of Directors, membership of LBDI’s Board of Directors must include representatives from a number of major private enterprises both local and international.
Thus at the time of the Vinton episode earlier mentioned above, the Bank’s Board of Directors included representatives from LAMCO, Bong Mines, Firestone Plantations Company, the International Trust Company (ITC) together with individual Liberian shareholders as well as representatives of a number of overseas private organizations. On hot button issues such as the Vinton episode and similar incidents, each of these substantial economic entities was represented at the Board meeting that ensued by its CEO. Needless to say, even Samuel Doe and the likes of him knew well enough not to callously rankle such a formidable gathering.
They Have Vested Interests
It is important to immediately emphasize that the right of representation on LBDI’s Board, per the preceding, has not been a matter of gratuitous and benevolent goodwill on the part of the Government of Liberia. Clearly, Samuel Doe would have found that so easy to undo. Rather, the key players mentioned above have been stakeholders, as Liberia’s partners in progress, with vested interest in LBDI. Along with the International Finance Corporation (IFC), an agency of the World Bank, they put up the seed money that got LBDI going as a development bank. They therefore earned their places and jealously guarded their clout on the Bank’s Board of Directors. Because they have a vested interest in the Bank, they have used their considerable economic clout and international connections to ensure that the Bank’s institutional independence has been maintained.
An Alternative Approach
With the preceding as a background why not suitably adopt the LBDI model in the current move to ensure the “complete independence” of the Central Bank of Liberia? As with the LBDI, a most attractive carrot in this regard would be the infusion of much needed financial resources into CBL in a way and under conditions that would guarantee the movers of LEGAP lasting clout in ensuring the fiscal and financial efficacy of the Central Bank of Liberia. The amount of money required for this purpose would be relatively insignificant for the investors but of immense value for Liberia. Moreover, not all it, possibly not even any of it, need be in the form of actual cash outlay. For example, like France has done for the CFA, the EU and/or the US could work out and put in place a mechanism to support the official exchange rate of the Liberian dollar against a selected hard currency, e.g. the US dollar or the Euro.
On this basis the designers of LEGAP could, among other things, then demand adequate representation on CBL’s Board of Governors with actual and effective authority either to hire and fire the Executive Governor (similar to LBDI) or alternatively to require that the President of Liberia appoints the Executive Governor and the Deputy Executive Governor of the Bank from a shortlist of vetted candidates to be provided by the Board. The Board would of course also have full unrestrained authority regarding the appointment of other key line staff of the Bank, whether Liberian or foreign. If need be they can then additionally demand the positioning of experienced technical advisors in key areas. Then by virtue of their presence on CBL’s Board of Governors, the framers of LEGAP could, consistent with the provisions of the Central Bank of Liberia Act also insist on exerting the Board’s statutory control over the printing of Liberian currency notes and the minting of coins, authority that is by law vested in the Board of Governors but which, for obvious reasons, is in practice exerted from without. This would be a far more acceptable way of ensuring due compliance “with the provisions of the 1999 Financial Institutions Act as well as the Central Bank of Liberia Act” than by external imposition of a so called “chief administrator with executive authority.”
The Benefits Of A Stable Currency/ (LPA once again?)
The benefit of giving real and effective control over the printing of notes and the minting of coins to such a reconstituted Board of Governors (consistent with the CBL Act), as herein proposed, would be a stable currency that in turn will promote a credit based rather than a cash based economy (i.e., revive and expand the old “LPA” credit system that was once a common and beneficial feature of the Liberian economy, when Liberia had a stable currency, the US dollar. This would in its turn help to expand commerce and industry and, by extension, also increase employment. Which would of course improve the general well being of the population and give the people of Liberia new realistic hope for a brighter future. Even the most ardent and vociferous sovereignty conscious Liberians are unlikely to object to an arrangement of this kind.
In my view, such arrangements (i.e., gaining effective control of the Central Bank of Liberia via representation on its Board of Governors,) would actually tend to give the international proponents of LEGAP far better control (albeit in the background) of the operations of the Central Bank of Liberia than would creation of “a new position of Chief Administrator with executive authority” but without the unpalatable appearance of effective receivership or trusteeship. After all, no one considers any member country of the francophone CFA zone to be in trusteeship or receivership. Why would any well meaning Liberian object to a similar situation with similar benefits for Liberia? As already stated, the key to securing widespread acceptance of control of the Bank in this way is the infusion of needed resources as was done with LBDI. This will be seen and readily accepted by Liberians as the quid pro quo for the control to be ceded. Then when need be the Board (restructured, as herein suggested) would be empowered to stand up to the Executive Mansion, whenever necessary, on issues that threaten the “complete independence” of the Bank.
All in all, membership of a group of expatriates (who are most likely to be widely perceived as helping and well intentioned) on the governing board of a sensitive national institution like the CBL, is not likely to be as intrusive and hence will likely not be seen as intrusive as the overt positioning of an externally imposed foreign agent “with executive authority.” Yet, if properly done along the lines of the LBDI model, this approach will, more than anything else, operate to ensure the level of true institutional independence and operational efficacy that are the ultimate objectives of the current LEGAP proposal.
Expatriate Management of State Owned Enterprises (SoEs)
Foreign management of Liberian SoEs is nothing new at all. Expatriates have previously managed many state owned enterprises in the 1960s and early to mid 1970s. In some cases the experience with expatriate management was generally good. In a few other cases (e.g. Air Liberia) expatriate management was a failure. Air Liberia collapsed within about ten years after it came into being, while still under expatriate management.
Those state owned enterprises that had been successfully managed by expatriates continued to function well and thrived after their managements were passed on to qualified Liberians. They continued to be well managed (about 1960-1980) and were successful as long as their management was left in competent and trustworthy Liberian hands. However, these once thriving entities began to quickly decay when their management and employment in them became unabashedly politicised after the coup d’état of 1980. That was the beginning of a bad situation that was subsequently made unbearably worse, in 1991 and beyond, when control of these state owned and once thriving economic enterprises was, in the interest of the “peace” that regrettably still eludes us, divvied up among greedy warring factions, who immediately proceeded to loot the SoEs with impunity (no audits for years) just as they had looted the rest of the Country in their quests for power. That basically is what actually killed so many of them, nearly wiped out others and brought all of the surviving SoEs, with LBDI as a notable exception, to the sorry state they are now in today. For reasons that are definitely suspect, the LEGAP proposal ignores the well-known history of how the SoEs came to be where they are. Instead, it prefers to operate on the assumption and strongly gives the unmistakable impression that the entities in question failed just and simply because they were Liberian managed. Nothing is said about the twenty years or so before 1980 when professional Liberians had successfully managed a number of these very same institutions (e.g., NPA, LPRC, LPMC, LBDI, etc.)
No Provisions for Liberian Professionals
As in the case of the CBL, the LEGAP document jumps to the unwarranted conclusion that the only way to revive these SoEs and get them on a good footing once again is that expatriate “financial controllers with signature authority need to be appointed [en mass]…at the large revenue generating agencies” of government. Strikingly, there does not seem to be any desire or intent on the part of those who prepared the LEGAP document to involve any Liberians, regardless of experience and competence, to participate in the restoration of their own nation.
Although the document is emphatic page after page, paragraph after paragraph about the “need” to put Liberia’s entire recovery program up for bids by “international experts” who are to work under “management contracts [to] be awarded on the basis of international competitive bidding,” it contains not a single word about counterpart arrangements or otherwise about the building of local Liberian capacity during or after the initial recovery period. So, even assuming that somehow qualified Liberian expertise is not currently available anywhere, whether in Liberia or outside of it, how do the framers of LEGAP expect such expertise to ever develop after the “international experts” have divided up the all of the “the large revenue generating agencies” of the Country among themselves, done their work, gotten their pay and left?
In my view, the single most important shortcoming of the current LEGAP proposal is its failure to clearly give qualified Liberians any meaningful role in the proposed recovery plan for their Country. Although the proposal is very specific over and over and again about where, when and how foreign technicians are to be brought into the Country’s recovery program, it is extremely vague at best about the use and development of Liberian professionals in the process. It is particularly noteworthy that the only meaningful reference of any kind in it to local capacity building is vaguely contained in two short paragraphs at the very end of the LEGAP document. One gets the impression that even this was in all probability no more than an afterthought; something thrown in just to quiet critics about the proposal’s apparent and disturbing lack of any interest in giving qualified Liberian professionals any opportunities to play a meaningful role in the rebuilding of their country.
Without a doubt expatriate expertise will certainly be needed in many, conceivably even all, of the problem areas identified in the LEGAP document. However, this should not and must not be done to the total or near total exclusion of qualified Liberian professionals or even upcoming trainable Liberian professionals. The LEGAP document, as it now stands, does certainly give the unmistakable impression that for some reason [no doubt a personal bias of some sort on the part of the staff writer(s) of the LEGAP document) there is definite and firm disinterest in involving Liberians in any significant way in the restoration program for their Country. In my view it is that impression and the insult it implies that has so many Liberians up in arms against the LEGAP proposal as it now stands.
That impression, whether or not it truly reflects the real intent of those who put the plan on paper, is a most serious defect that must be promptly cured. There is therefore an urgent need to revisit the proposal with the view to putting into it very clear and specific provisions about where, when and how qualified Liberian professionals are to be incorporated into the recovery process for their Country in much the same way as the document is clear and specific about the role of “international experts” in the process.
This need is based on the principle that whenever economic opportunities emerge in any country, it is only fair that the nationals of that country be given good enough access to such opportunities. Indeed, the nationals have a natural first claim, by reason of their birth, to such opportunities. This is a self evident and requires no argument. It should apply in the case of Liberia and Liberians. The Government of Liberia, both the current interim administration and the elected government expected to come in after the coming October elections, have an obligation to insist on this. They must insist that clear, unambiguous and definitive language is put into a revised LEGAP document in this regard and then take steps to ensure that the provisions are rigorously implemented. Do this properly and fairly and the LEGAP document should, in my view, be good to go.
A Possible Alternative
Meanwhile, GOL is also well advised to consider privatising, in whole or in part, a number of the state owned enterprises in question. If this approach is taken, there may well be some initial layoffs of employees at some SoEs following privatisation. However, employment in them should rationally pickup again after the revitalized entities start to find their way in the economy. Hence there should in the long run be an overall net gain in employment at these enterprises.
Establishing Effective Judicial Processes to Control Corruption
The LEGAP document provides that “in the short term, judges from the sub-region must be brought in to support the return of the rule of law to Liberia, particularly in the area of documented cases of corruption.” In my view, this is perhaps the toughest call in the LEGAP proposal. Immensely grateful though we are to them for putting the lives of their troops on the line to save Liberians from themselves; and with all due respects to our fraternal neighbours in the sub region, it is truly difficult to see that, all other things being equal, their lawyers and judges are likely to have greater integrity and be less corrupt than their Liberian counterparts. After all, the other Anglophone countries of the sub region (The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leon) do also have the same kind of underlying justice problems that exist in Liberia, even granting that ours have been exacerbated by our civil war.
“All other things being equal” means assuming that the foreign legal experts live under the same economic conditions and get the same compensation and benefits as Liberian lawyers and judges. In that case it is truly difficult to see that foreign judges brought in “from the sub region” or from anywhere else are realistically likely to have any meaningful and beneficial impact on the justice system of Liberia. Or to put it another way, if Liberian judges and lawyers are provided the same living conditions (a well furnished home with adequate utilities – tab water, bath shower, electricity, air conditioning, cooking gas, etc.), the same take home pay, job security and job benefits as those that will doubtless be given to their expatriate counterparts; and provided they are also well vetted, as those to come from the sub region will certainly be, it is just simply difficult to see that the Liberians will do any worse, their improved living conditions notwithstanding, than foreign judges and lawyers.
Involving Liberian Professionals
Hence, the questions that need to be asked and answered are not so much whether, when and which foreign lawyers and judges to bring in from the sub region, or from anywhere else, but how to support Liberian prosecutors, judges and other operators of the Liberian judiciary in a ways that will effectively minimize on a sustainable basis the pressures and temptations for corrupt dealings. Bringing in foreign legal experts may then be considered as a viable supplemental approach. After all even assuming that expatriate lawyers and judges were brought in at some stage of the rebuilding program; and also assuming that somehow these “international experts” did manage to clean up the Liberian justice system for a while, they would of course eventually have to hand back the cleaned up system to Liberian lawyers and judges to carry on from there.
In that case it goes without saying that the old problems would quickly return unless of course the fundamental issues that engender corruption in the Liberian justice system are thoroughly reviewed and realistic solutions to them found and put in place. Failing that anything done and any money spent to cleanup Liberia’s justice system will amount to a stupendous waste of time and money. In that case success, if any, will be temporary at best and only for the duration of the LEGAP implementation period. Thereafter, it will be a matter of putting new wine into old wineskins, the disastrous consequences of such a shortsighted approach being a foregone conclusion. And when that happens Liberians will be the fall guys for such clearly predictable failure. They will be seen as invincibly corrupt and incompetent. The well-paid “international partners” would have returned to their homes or to other positions elsewhere with new accolades added to their revised CVs and the designers of this predictable grand failure will, their stupendous fiasco notwithstanding, congratulate themselves on a job well done.
This why it is sad that the current LEGAP proposal so characteristically gives no consideration of any kind at all to finding and meaningfully involving qualified Liberian legal professionals in their plan to save our justice system. Instead, as in all other cases (Ministry of Finance, Budget Bureau, Bureau of Customs & Excise, CBL, SoEs, etc.), the principal thrust of the LEGAP approach is simply the wholesale importation of hordes of “international partners” with the unrealistic expectation that the new arrivals will somehow find lasting solutions to the underlying fundamental problems that the outsiders are indeed most unlikely to even begin to understand. To add insult to injury, it appears intended and designed that these “international partner” are to displace (or at least marginalize) their Liberian counterparts who are naturally much better placed to understand and find workable solutions for the underlying problems.
This approach is driven by what appears to be an overriding dismissive attitude, on the part of the writer(s) of the proposal, on anything having to do with the technical competence, independence of mind or the moral integrity of Liberian professionals. Throughout the document, its preparer(s) seem to very quickly assume, without any rational basis, that Liberians without exception and regardless of where they are located, whether in Liberia or overseas, just simply do not have the professional skills required to help solve their Country’s problems nor even the independence of mind and the basic moral integrity that some positions will require. Hence, as the preparer(s) of the LEGAP document see it, the only solution to correcting the problems in Liberia’s justice system is that “judges from the sub-region must be brought in… These judges will work with the Liberian judiciary to support the dispensation of justice while international partners work in parallel to revive the Liberian justice system.”
But how will the foreign judges “work with the Liberian judiciary” if the underlying afflictions of the Liberian judiciary are not adequately addressed? And how then will “international partners work in parallel to revive the Liberian justice system” again without addressing the fundamental issues that affect the people who operate the justice system? Corruption does not exist in a vacuum. It is a human phenomenon. A corrupt justice system simply means that those who operate that system (judges, lawyers and others including sheriffs, court clerks, etc.) are dishonest, i.e., corrupt. Therefore, it is plainly a matter of common sense that any cleansing of a corrupt system, whether a justice system or any other system; whether in Liberia or anywhere else on God’s earth, must focus on and adequately address the underlying factors that motivate the humans who run that system to behave as they do. For reasons that are not clear but are suspect (e.g. securing lucrative employment for themselves, their compatriots and/or others) the writer(s) of the LEGAP proposal do not appear at all disposed to go that route.
That being the case, how then do the preparer(s) of the LEGAP document propose to have “judges from the sub-region” work in harmony (presumably as equal?) with their counterparts in the “Liberian judiciary to support the dispensation of justice” without giving adequate attention to the factors affecting members of the “Liberian judiciary?” And how will the “international partners [work] in parallel to revive the Liberian justice system” again without addressing the fundamental issues that affect those (presumably the locals?) with whom the foreigners are supposed to “work in parallel?” How do you get clean and honest judges to work together with corrupt ones, without caring to do anything at all about what drives the dishonorable guys to behave as they do? It’s like attempting to mix oil and water. They just simply do not mix well. Or like mixing clean clothes with dirty ones in the hope that the dirty ones will thereby become clean. It just simply does not work that way. The dirty clothes must first be separately washed and made clean. Only then will mixing the two lots make sense. Otherwise the entire exercise is likely to become dysfunctional: the dirty clothes being more likely to contaminate the clean ones than the clean ones to make the dirty lot clean.
Indeed, there is already credible evidence that during their relatively brief stay in Liberia, since mid 2003, some top ranking elements within the highest echelons of the current UN Mission to Liberia (UNMIL) are known to have adopted private lifestyles that, although culturally acceptable and commonplace in the Country, have nonetheless been a source of grave embarrassment at UN headquarters in New York, because such lifestyles are in violation of a particular UN code of conduct. Consequently those concerned have been quietly replaced. Moreover, in earlier times, during the interim administrations of Amos Sawyer and David Kpormakpor, at least two Special Representatives of the UN Secretary General (SRSGs) have had to leave Liberia under clouds of widely rumoured questions of personal integrity. Witness also the well publicized sexual exploitation/abuse scandals involving UN operators in DRC, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Liberia, etc. as well as the UN “Oil For Food” scandal in Iraq.
The point here is that corruption is not by any means an exclusive Liberian phenomenon. The malefactors of the scandals mentioned above and of many others are from all over the world: North and South America, Europe, Asia, Africa, etc. and from all sorts of backgrounds. Therefore the mere fact that there is corruption, even rampant corruption in their Country (as in other countries within “the sub region” and outside of it) should not be used as an excuse to systematically and derisively exclude Liberians from participating in the restoration program for their Country.
Although the LEGAP document sees the importation of judges and “international partners” as necessary only “in the short term,” it contains no suggestions at all for a long term solution. There is not a single word anywhere in the document as to how Liberian lawyers are to be utilized in straightening out the Liberian justice system. The practical effect of this short-sighted approach is likely to be that Liberian legal professionals, precisely those whose input is necessary to make the system work, will be marginalized in the international community’s efforts to find lasting solutions for our legal system. In my view such approach is fundamentally flawed and potentially disastrous. For unless Liberian professionals are made an integral part of the solution process in a way that gives them pride in owning the end results (thereby motivating them to permanently preserve the cleaned up system), the solutions, if any, that may be found under the proposed approach are likely to be temporary at best. As earlier stated, the current LEGAP approach is predictably wasteful and potentially disastrous. Therefore, the LEGAP document needs to be revisited with a view to correcting this very serious fault.
Getting Around the Constitutional Hurdle
In any case, other commentator on the LEGAP proposals have pointed out that the revised constitution of Liberian requires that only Liberian citizens may practice law in the Country. The justification for this requirement, if indeed the claim is true, is arguable at best in my personal opinion. But that is not the point at issue at this time, that point being basically that the law of the land must be followed unless and until it is changed in accordance with due process. In this case due process for changing a constitutional provision would normally require a national referendum. Hence, the question now is how to get past that constitutional barrier, assuming there is indeed one.
My views on this concern are twofold. Firstly, laws are made (or in any case they should be made) for the good of the society they are intended to govern. Hence they should be changed if the good of that society so requires. Secondly, these are most certainly NOT normal times. It is therefore does make sense to demand a normal time solution in this case. Besides, those who trumpet the constitutional argument against the LEGAP proposal conveniently ignore the well known fact that other provisions of this very same constitution have twice been set aside as a matter of national expediency: once to allow Charles Taylor and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to contest the elections of 1997 and now again to allow many others, including Charles Brumskine, Ellen again, John Morlu, etc. to contest the upcoming election. As a matter of national expediency, no national referendum was required each time and none has been carried out.
Hence, provided bringing in expatriate judges and lawyers can be shown to be ultimately for the good of Liberia now or later, it should be possible also as a matter of national expediency to accommodate this element of the LEGAP proposal without insisting on constitutional technicalities. To enable presidential candidates who would otherwise not have qualified to compete in the 1997 elections and in the upcoming ones, reference was made to the provisions of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (ACPA). Provided the political will is there, that same ACPA can be similarly used as a reference point to find sufficient justification to allow expatriate judges and lawyers into the Liberian justice system, (once again) if that course of action is considered in the long term interest of the Country.
Personally, I’m all for giving Liberia and its people the benefit of any doubt in this regard. Solely for that reason, I think the experiment would be worth trying out but only on the basis of negotiated understanding that provides clear, definite and specific requirements that unequivocally give qualified Liberian professionals meaningful roles in the anti corruption project as well as in all other aspects of the entire LEGAP program. There should also be clear and specific provisions for additionally involving trainable upcoming Liberians in the program in truly meaningful ways. As earlier stated, Liberians have a natural first claim to benefit from any economic opportunities that arise in their Country.
Summary
The LEGAP document contains an excellent factual outline of Liberia’s basic problems in all the important areas: governance, budgeting and financial management, the national economy, justice and the judiciary. However, without exception and in every single case the proposed solution boils down to bringing in “international experts” with “executive authority” or “signature authority” to deal with the problems identified. This pattern is consistent throughout the LEGAP document, giving the inescapable impression that those who prepared it have an extremely poor regard for Liberian professionals either in terms of their technical competence, their independence of mind and/or in terms of their personal integrity. In all cases, the document ignores the fundamental fact that only Liberians can and must provide permanent long term solutions to their Country’s problems. As a result many well meaning Liberians who sympathize with the core concepts of the LEGAP proposal, have been angered and turned off by what they consider the implied insults contained in the LEGAP document.
Even so Liberians do need to be fair to themselves. They should not throw out the baby with the proverbial bath water. This is what will happen if we simply reject LEGAP out of hand because of a particular weakness in a document that, at this stage, is only a proposal. After all, we are the ones who need help, not the preparer(s) of the LEGAP document and not the international community that supports it.
We also must be realistic enough to understand and accept that we just simply cannot pull ourselves out of the mess we are in without outside help. Outsiders will therefore have to come in and become part of the process of saving us from ourselves (which they are already doing in other fundamental respects anyway). By so doing they will no doubt be exposed even to very sensitive national matters that we would quite naturally prefer keep in house. But the ugly truth is that we are where we are and we do surely and sorely need outside help. The good part is that if correctly done this national eating of humble pie will only be temporary and we will, in time, get back our national pride once again. We are neither the first nor the only nation to undergo this kind of experience nor will we be the last. Hence, we stand to gain by taking a positive approach to the LEGAP proposal. Where required we should point out and reject the unacceptable aspects of the proposal, while embracing the good aspects of it. Without a doubt, the LEGAP proposal does have many redeeming qualities to it. Where we disagree with any aspect of any specific proposals, we owe it to ourselves and to those who want to help us, to come up with workable alternative proposals.
As already stated, we must bear in mind that the LEGAP document as it now stands is only a proposal prepared by technicians. We still have a chance to influence its final form. Provided we are responsible and reasonable in so doing the leaders of ECOWAS, the EU and the US will doubtless give serious consideration to our views. Only thus can we expect to win the day in this matter. Angry outbursts without a showing of workable alternative suggestions will do us no good. Indeed, it will only give others (especially those who want to get the Liberian problem resolved so they can move on to other important world issues) a reason to simply ignore us.
This piece is part of my attempt to make Liberia’s case and to offer what I consider workable alternatives to disagreeable aspects of the LEGAP proposal. In it I have discussed only three specific topics of the LEGAP document. However, the observations made in these three areas also basically apply to all other sections of the LEGAP document. That is, Liberian professionals must be actively involved in the process if the proposed measures are to succeed and have their intended effects on a permanent or long term basis. The sooner this is done the better.
The Sovereignty Question
One last word on the so called sovereignty issue. The primary responsibility of any government worth its salt is the protection of life and property. Without a doubt we have failed that test woefully. Even now, the protection of our head of state, other officials of government and the people of Liberia is in the hands of the foreigners that some of us are so quick to disparage.
Moreover, because they have put the lives of their troops on line and in harm’s way in order to save us from ourselves, they have, in my view, thereby earned the right to have some say in how we conduct our affairs, especially if that say has to do with helping us address the underlying causes of or civil conflict; or has to do with measures that they believe will eventually enable us to take over the handling of our own national affairs – so that they can leave us alone and go home and not have to keep coming back again and again to save us from destroying our Country and ourselves.
Bottom line: whatever its shortcomings, LEGAP is just such an attempt. As already stated, we owe it to ourselves and to succeeding generations of Liberians to look at the matter dispassionately with the view to making the best of the opportunity now before us. Let us not be another Somalia, a stubborn people whom the rest of the world has forgotten just because they will not allow others to help them. If we blow this chance, like Somalia did more some ten years ago, we may not get another opportunity to save our Country and provide sustainable hope for its people.
Based on the preceding, in my view, the so called sovereignty argument just simply does not hold any water.
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